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ABSTRACT
This preliminary study aims to investigate children’s ability to understand that the emotional
expressions that occur in pretend play do not necessarily coincide with the emotions people feel
inside. Previous research has found that children aged 4 and 6 have difficulty to distinguish between
the external and the internal emotion of a character who pretends an emotion. In the present work,
thirteen 4-year-olds and eight 6-year-olds were administered stories in which a character simulated
an emotion. Differently from previous research, the questions addressed to the children did not
focus on the distinction external/internal emotion but on the distinction between real/pretend emo-
tion. Furthermore, since previous research has suggested that children may understand better self-
pretence than pretence of others, the participants in our study were engaged in a pretence situation
where they had to pretend to be happy. The results obtained showed that, contrary to previous
research, most 4- and 6-year-olds realize that pretend emotions may not be real, and this was true
both for self-pretence and for the pretence of others.
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INTRODUCTION
The theory of mind is the human capacity to understand the social world through the attribution
of mental states (such as beliefs, desires, intentions or emotions) that serves to explain the people’s
behaviour (Lucariello, Durand & Yarnell, 2007). Wellman and Liu (2004) have proposed that the the-
ory of the mind consists of a series of skills that people acquire progressively during development.
One of these skills is the ability to recognize and participate in pretend play situations, a phenome-
non almost exclusively human (Rakoczy, 2005). Around the age of 2, the pretend or symbolic play
already involves a non-literal treatment of objects, and children are already capable of making infer-
ences from pretend play situations and behave accordingly (Rakoczy, Tomasello & Striano, 2006).
After the age of 3, children typically start to assign roles within their pretend games, and to negoti-
ate metalinguistically the issues they want to pretend (Bretherton, 1989). In the literature, however,
there is no agreement on whether the pretend play involves metarepresentational skills. While some
authors consider the understanding of symbolic play as an acting-as-if, which considers that chil-
dren do not view pretend play as a form of intentional activity until at least the age of 4 or 5 (Nichols
& Stich, 2003), other authors support an interpretation of the pretend play as a social event with a
shared intentionality (Rakoczy, 2006). According to Friedman and Leslie (2007), the theories that
consider pretend play as non-representational cannot explain the premature abilities of children to
produce and interpret symbolic play. Therefore, if children did not have these metarepresentational
abilities, they would confound pretend play and real events. Nevertheless, as Lillard (1994) sug-
gests, the metacognitive signs or the typical mannerisms intrinsic to the pretend play situations
could explain children’s ability to distinguish the real from the pretend worlds without the need to
understand pretend play in a metarrepresentational way. In the same vein, the results by Sidera,
Serrat, Rostan and Sanz-Torrent (2011), who observed the difficulty of 4-year-olds to realize that the
emotions displayed by other people in pretend play situations may be different from their real emo-
tions, support the view that young children do not understand pretend emotions in a metarepresen-
tational way. While these authors asked children about the internal emotions of some characters that
were pretending an emotion, in the present study the questions asked to the children are whether
the simulated emotions are real or pretend. On the other hand, Mitchell and Neal (2005) observed
that in a pretend play context, it is easier for children from 4 to 6 years of age to understand their
own mental states than those of others. Therefore, children’s capacity to realize that pretend emo-
tions can be different from internal emotions might be easier for the children when they pretend
emotions themselves rather than when they observe other children pretending. In this study, we will
test this hypothesis by comparing situations where the children will pretend emotions themselves
with situations where they will observe other children pretending. 
METHOD
Participants
A total 13 four-year-olds (13 girls, 4 boys; age range: 48 to 56 months; mean age: 51,15 months;
SD: 1,91) and 8 six-year-olds (7 boys, 1 girl; age range: 62 to 66 months; mean age: 65 months;
SD: 1,41) participated in the study. They were recruited from two public schools in the area of
Girona, in Spain. They were Catalan speakers, and the tasks were administered in Catalan language.
In order to participate in the study, children were expected to distinguish real from pretend actions
(see Real versus pretend actions task). A total of three 4-year-olds did not participate in the study
for that reason.
Instruments
Children were administered the following 6 tasks: 
a) Real versus pretend actions task
This task, that was adapted from Rosen, Schwebel and Singer (1997), was used to study chil-
dren’s understanding of the distinction between pretend and real actions. Participants were shown
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six videos of a young girl doing actions. In the half of the videos, the protagonist performed real
actions (eating a banana, combing her hair or brushing her teeth), and in the other half, the protag-
onist pretended to do the same actions (“eating” a plastic banana, “combing” without a comb and
“brushing” without a brush). Participants were asked whether the actions were real or pretend (“is
this girl really brushing her teeth or she is just pretending to brush his teeth?”).  Children obtained
one point for each pair of videos (real-pretend action) answered correctly. The range score was from
0 to 3, and children who obtained 0 or 1 were not included in the sample.
b) Understanding emotions simulated by oneself task
In this task, within a pretend play context, children were asked to simulate to be sad and they
were asked if the emotion they had showed was real or pretended. This was done two times. In one
type of task, children were asked to simulate sadness because a toy car was broken (toy car task),
and in the other task, children were asked to simulated sadness because a stuffed mice (mice task)
got hurted in his leg.
In the toy car task, the experimenter started saying: “Ok X, now we will play a fun game, but first
I will introduce you a friend of mine, Enric.” Then, a puppet of a man entered on the scene and said
to the children: “Hello, my name is Enric, what’s your name?” After that, Enric brought a toy car and
said: “Look X, I brought a car. Now I leave to my home to sleep for a while. Goodbye! Next, the
experimenter asked the children if he liked the toy that the puppet had left, and then asked to the
child the internal emotion question: “how do you feel now, happy or sad?” Once the child had
answered, the experimenter said: “Ok, now we will pretend that the toy car has broken, and we will
show a sad face, ok? Oh, the toy car has fallen…” Here, the experimenter crashed the car against
the table, showed a sad face, and said: “Oh, the car got broken, what a pity! Let’s see how you show
a sad face…” In that moment, Enric went back to the scene and said: “Hi X, why do you show a sad
face? You did not like my toy?” Afterwards, the experimenter asked two questions. The first ques-
tion was addressed to the beliefs of Enric about the feelings of the child (this question is not taken
into account in this study). The second question, or real emotion question, was addressed to inves-
tigate if the child was aware that his real emotion when he was pretending to be sad was not of sad-
ness: “X, when you were showing a sad face, where you really sad or you pretended to be sad?” 
The mice task was similar to the toy car task, except that in the mice task the puppet Enric stayed
and participated in the pretend play situation.
Children were awarded 1 point if, in the real emotion question, they answered that they were just
pretending. As there were two types of task, children could score 2 points.
c) Understanding emotions simulated by others task.
Children were administered four pretend play tasks, adapted from those used by Sidera et al.
(2011). Children were told 4 stories in which 2 characters played a pretend game, and one of them,
the protagonist, pretended one emotion (happy or sad) while feeling different inside (sad or happy).
In two of the tasks, the protagonist showed a happy face while feeling sad (negative tasks), and in
the other two tasks, the protagonist showed a sad face while feeling happy (positive tasks). Two
memory questions were asked in each task to check if children understood and remembered it. In
case children did not answer correctly to these questions, they were repeated the story one more
time. If children understood the story, they were asked two test questions in order to study their
understanding that the emotions expressed by the protagonist were not real but just pretence.
Despite the four stories used here were the same as in Sidera et al., the test questions were changed.
The external emotion question was maintained, but instead of asking about the internal emotion of
the protagonist, in the present study we asked the children whether the protagonist was feeling real-
ly happy/sad, or she was just pretending:
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External emotion question: “How does the protagonist look like, happy or sad?”
Real emotion question: “Is the protagonist really happy / sad, or she is just pretending?”
In addition, a question about the beliefs of the observer of the emotional simulation was made
in each task, though it is not taken into account for the present study.
Children were awarded 1 point in each of the stories in which they answered in the real emotion
question that the protagonist was just pretending. Therefore, the maximum score was 4.
d) Receptive vocabulary test. The ELI test (Saborit & Julián, 2005) was used to evaluate the
receptive vocabulary in Catalan language. In this test, children were given a word and they had to
point the correct from among five different pictures.
Finally, a version of the desire-belief-emotion task (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke,
1989; Experiment 2), and a version of the sentential complement sentences task (Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003), were also administered to the children, though their results are not reported in this
paper. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually in one session (15 to 25 minutes), in a quiet room from their
schools. They were audio and video recorded. Children were administered the six tasks in the same
order as they appear in the instruments section. In the Real versus pretend actions task, the videos
were presented in pairs, so the real and the pretend action were always showed one after the other.
Half of the children saw always the real action first and the other half the pretend action first. In the
Understanding emotions simulated by oneself task, the order of presentation of the two types of task
were counterbalanced. In the Understanding emotions simulated by others task the order of pres-
entation of the four stories was counterbalanced.
RESULTS
Real versus pretend actions task
In the younger group (four-year-olds), two children obtained a score of 2 points in this task,
while the rest obtained 3 points (Mean: 2,88; SD: .354). In the older group (six-year-olds), only one
child obtained a score of 2 points and the 7 other children obtained 3 points (Mean: 2,88; SD: .354).
Understanding emotions simulated by oneself task
In both types of task, all the children, independently of their age, reported to be happy in the
internal emotion question, before they were asked to simulate to be sad. After children showed a sad
face, they were asked the real emotion question (see Table 1). The results show that, when asked
“when you were showing a sad face, where you really sad or you pretended to be sad?” the major-
ity of the children said that they pretended to be sad. This happened in both tasks and in both age
groups. Comparing the results of the younger and the older children in each task, using the Chi-
square test, we observed that there were not significant differences as a function of age in the
responses they gave in any of the two tasks (p > .05).
In order to compare the results of children in the Understanding emotions simulated by oneself
task (maximum score = 2) and their results in the Real versus pretend actions task (maximum score
= 3), we multiplied the scores of the first task per 1.5, to equal the maximum scores. Then, we used
the Wilcoxon test to compare children’s scores in the two tasks, and we found a significant differ-
ence (Z = -2.335, p = .020). While children had a mean of 2.86 (SD = .359) in the Real versus pre-
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tend action task, they had a mean of 2,1 (SD = 1.32) in the Understanding emotions simulated by
oneself task.
Table 1. Results of the real emotion question in the Understanding emotions simulated by oneself task, as a
function of age and type of task.
Understanding emotions simulated by others task
The results of the children in this task are shown in Table 2. The children responded correctly to
all the external emotion question, so its results are not included in the table. In relation to the real
emotion question, as shown in the table, the majority of children said that the protagonists of the
stories were pretending to be happy or sad, and this is valid for both the younger and the older group
of children. In fact, using the Chi-square test we observed that there were not significant differences
as a function of age in the responses the children gave in the real emotion question, and this is valid
for the four tasks (p > .05).
Table 2. Results of the real emotion question in the Understanding emotions simulated by others task, as a
function of age and type of task.
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Toy car Mice
Really sad Pretend to be sad Really sad Pretend to be sad
4-year-olds
(N = 13)
4 9 4 9
6-year-olds
(N = 7)
3 4 1 6
Notes:
a) The results show the number of children giving each type of answer.
b) The responses of one six-year-old in this task were lost, so they are 7 instead of 8.



















3 9 3 9 5 6 4 5
6-year-olds
N = 8
1 7 0 8 2 5 2 6
Notes:
a) The results show the number of children giving each type of answer.
b) In some tasks, there were children who did not respond correctly to the memory questions. These children do
not appear on the table, and that is why the results do not fit sometimes the number of participants.
Comparing the understanding of simulated emotions in oneself and others
We compared the scores of the children who said that they only pretended to be sad between
the tasks where the sadness was simulated by oneself (toy car and mice tasks) with the tasks where
the sadness was simulated by other children (tasks 1 and 2). The Wilcoxon test shows that there are
not significant differences in children’s performance of the two types of tasks in none of the two age
groups (p > .05). Indeed, there is a very high correlation (Pearson) in the scores of the children in
the two types of tasks (r = .895, p = .000). 
DISCUSSION
An interesting conclusion from the results of this preliminary study is that children are better at
distinguishing real from pretend actions than real from pretend emotions. In fact, the literature sug-
gests that the use of emotions in pretend play occurs after the use of objects. Whereas children’s
ability to participate and recognise pretend play appears at the age of 12-16 months (Smith, Cowie
& Blades, 2003), the attribution of emotions to toys in pretend play starts later, between the ages of
22 and 34 months (Wolf, Rygh & Atschuler, 1984). Furthermore, real emotions can never be
observed, and children might use pretend play as a tool to change their internal emotions (Barnett,
1984). Thus, if pretending to be happy might makes me happy, how do other people know if my hap-
piness is real or not? Researchers have found several linguistic and behavioural cues that indicate
to the children when other people are pretending (Lillard, 2006), but to our knowledge it has not
been addressed yet the question of which cues the children use to indicate that their pretend emo-
tions are not real. This would be an interesting issue for future research.
Our results show that children as young as 4-year-olds understand that when someone is sim-
ulating an emotion, the emotion expressed may not be real. Therefore, they may understand simu-
lated emotions in a metarrepresentational way. These results are quite surprising taking into account
Sidera et al. (2011) results, who suggested that 4-year-olds were not able to distinguish, in pretend
play stories, that the emotions expressed by the protagonists could be different from their internal
emotions. Moreover, the tasks used in the present study were the same as in Sidera et al. study,
except for the test questions. Whereas Sidera et al. asked children about the internal emotion of the
protagonist, in the current study, we have asked the children whether the protagonist is really
happy/sad or she just pretends to be happy/sad. A possible way to reconcile the results of both stud-
ies is to interpret that, as Gardner et al. (1988) suggested, 4-year-olds do understand that the emo-
tions people simulate are not real, and they thus differentiate the emotions expressed in pretend con-
texts from the emotions expressed in real contexts. Then, why young children from Sidera et al.
study were unable to say that the internal emotion of the protagonist could be different from the pre-
tend emotion he expressed? Perhaps the distinction internal/external was too sophisticated for
them, but it might not be needed to distinguish real from pretend emotions. As Peskin (1996) sug-
gested, the distinction reality-pretence precedes the distinction reality-appearance. This might be
also the case in children’s understanding of pretend emotions. 
It seems quite surprising that the performance of 6-year-olds in distinguishing real from pretend
emotions was not better than that of 4-year-olds. We hope that the continuation of the present
research will bring new data to discuss this aspect, but one possibility is that this understanding is
still developed after the age of six. This seems plausible, since Sidera et al. found that from the age
of 6 to the age of 8 there is an increase in children’s understanding that in pretend play internal emo-
tions might differ from external emotions.
Another finding from the present study, which needs to be confirmed, is that children’s under-
standing that simulated emotions might not be real is similar regardless of who is pretending, them-
selves or others. This finding is at odds with Mitchell and Neal’s (2005) proposal that in pretend play
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contexts children aged 4 to 6 years understand better their own mental states than those of others.
In their task, children had to judge if someone or themselves doing an action that unintentionally
resembled the action of an animal was pretence or not. They found that children tended to make this
judgement considering the overt behaviour rather than the intention to pretend. One possible expla-
nation is that children in self-pretence performed better because they were able to recognise that
they did not have such an intention, while disregarded the fact that the others did not have this inten-
tion either. In our study, the majority of the children did not confound overt behaviour, or the expres-
sion of sadness, with the real emotion, no matter if they were themselves or other people who were
simulating. The difference between our study and the study by Mitchell and Neal (2005) may be that
what is questioned in their task is the intention to pretend, while this is taken for granted in the pres-
ent study.
In sum, the results of this work show that children aged 4 and 6 are better at distinguishing real
from pretend actions than real from pretend emotions. Our results also suggest that, in spite of their
difficulty with the distinction internal/external emotion, most of 4- and 6-year-olds are capable of
realizing that when other people or themselves pretend an emotion, it does not necessarily be real.
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